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RESUMEN: El propósito del artículo es el desarrollo y prueba de un modelo explicativo de 
estrategias peculiares a la censura política cognitiva ejemplificada en la campaña electoral 
presidencial ucraniana 2018-2019. Los autores amplían y generalizan aspectos objetivos y subjetivos 
de los enfoques disponibles en la literatura científica a las nuevas formas de censura política. En un 
aspecto, no solo la capacidad de atención por sí sola se considera como un objeto de censura política 
cognitiva, sino también otras funciones cognitivas de la audiencia de los medios es la capacidad de 
formarse una opinión coherente sobre los problemas actuales. Al menos tres estrategias cognitivas de 
censura política identificadas sugirieron de un debilitamiento de las capacidades cognitivas básicas: 
distracción, falsificación y absurdo. Estas estrategias se consideran en una perspectiva comparativa 
con la experiencia de las últimas formas de censura política en China y Turquía. 
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ABSTRACT: The purpose of the article is the development and testing of an explanatory model of 
strategies peculiar to cognitive political censorship exemplified in the 2018-2019 Ukrainian 
presidential election campaign. The authors extend and generalize objective and subjective aspects 
of the approaches available in the scientific literature to new forms of political censorship. In one 
aspect, not only the attention span alone is considered as an object of cognitive political censorship, 
but also other cognitive functions of the media audience is the ability to form a coherent opinion on 
current problems. At least three cognitive strategies of political censorship identified suggested a 
weakening of basic cognitive abilities: distraction, forgery and absurdity. These strategies are 
considered in a comparative perspective with the experience of the latest forms of political censorship 
in China and Turkey. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
Until recently, research on censorship was associated with the function of governmental institutions 
that ensure public order and consent through censorship of information. Nonetheless, it was 
emphasized that the institutions of political censorship reached their peak in authoritarian and 
totalitarian societies, while self-censorship and social control dominated in democratic politics. 
However, in recent years, an opinion has increasingly been voiced that the phenomenon of 
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‘omnicensorship’ (Goryaeva 2009:9), which includes formal and informal prohibitions in the field 
of ideology and politics, does not necessarily apply only to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, 
but acts as a stabilizing factor in any kind of power. Moreover, it is recognized that even practices 
of political censorship of an authoritarian model were often not a simple police action, but a creative 
game between authors, publishers, and censors (Darnton, 2014).  
Certainly, this approach does not deny the significance of the differences between political 
censorship in different types of political regimes. However, the form of political censorship is no 
less dependent on media progress. Further, this reveals that censorship, corresponding to the realities 
of ‘The Gutenberg Galaxy’; nowadays, in the era of social networks, is fading into the background; 
a new form of political censorship is becoming more effective, the understanding of which in the 
social sciences is only at the very beginning.  
The traditional governmental censorship restricts access to certain texts, and by the commission, 
bans the ideas that are undesirable for public dissemination, turning into politically dangerous 
actions.  
Accelerating growth in the information scope in the Internet era is quite difficult to control the old-
fashioned ways; on the other hand, it is also of immense complexity for an ordinary person to 
navigate through. New information and communication technologies make reality a kind of ‘liquid’, 
eluding the usual criteria for its perception and evaluation. Distinctive features of this ‘liquid reality’ 
are ‘media torrent’ and ‘information overload’ (Gitlin, 2001). The redundancy of information, which 
is typical for the new media, makes it very difficult to verify; in turn, the latter would make it possible 
to distinguish a reasonable opinion from a hypothetical judgment, and an accidental lie – from 
deliberated misinformation. The latest form of political censorship is based on this cognitively 
vulnerable moment of Internet communications. 
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Both foreign and Russian scientific literature has already established a solid tradition of interpreting 
censorship as a political institution in a wider and more complex socio-cultural context than is 
usually done.  
Based on the classical works of G. Tarde, E.A. Ross, R.E. Park, P. Sorokin, and J. Ortega y Gasset, 
censorship is comprehended primarily as a sanction of social control. This research line is close to 
the traditions of the Frankfurt School and consistent with the ideas of E. Fromm and M. Foucault. 
The latter also proposed an original concept of the ‘logic of censorship’, linking into one causal node 
the ‘the inexistent, the illicit, and the inexpressible’ of censorship mechanisms (Foucault, 1978: 84). 
In Russian academic literature, this line was developed further from the standpoint of social control, 
and sociocultural and sociological approach by Y.I. Giliginsky, V.N. Kudryavtsev, A.M. Yakovlev, 
I.V. Shmarova et al. (Afanasyev, 1972).  
Of particular importance for the study is an approach that presents censorship as a socio-cultural 
phenomenon and as a product of the social structure (Parsons, 2002), as a public environment in the 
form of diverging concentric circles of control (Berger, 1963), and as the ‘information society’ (Bell, 
1974). As part of this tradition, the Chilean sociologist Roberto Hozven introduced in the 1980s the 
conceptual triad of ‘censorship – self-censorship – counter-censorship’, which takes on new heuristic 
meanings in the study of the latest forms of political censorship (Hozven, 1982). In particular, the 
counter-censorship (or anti-censorship) is still insufficiently studied in terms of the effects of new 
media. Within the framework of the presented study, anti-censorship can be considered in the form 
of opposing not only traditional (for example, ‘copyleft’ as the antithesis of ‘copyright censorship’), 
but also cognitive political censorship based on the generation of information flooding.   
The idea of censorship implemented not through police control, but discourse-symbolic means, in 
and of itself is not a new phenomenon; it is similar to propaganda that manipulates stereotypes and 
other symbolic surrogates. Walter Lippmann had demonstrated a while back that ‘without some 
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forms of censorship, propaganda in the strict sense of the word is impossible’ (Lippmann, 1997: 43). 
Symbolic censorship has grown since the Lippmann era of the so-called ‘political correctness’, 
which several Western authors also interpret as a form of censorship control with a blurred border 
between formal and informal prohibitions (Cohen, 2015; Wilson, 2015).  
The concept of ‘invisible censorship’, proposed by Pierre Bourdieu in his analysis of television 
discourse in the aspect of discursive manipulations and ‘symbolic oppression’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 12-
15), is even closer to the discursive concept of symbolic censorship. This concept is also similar to 
the notion of ‘symbolic power’, developed later by Teun A. van Dijk (van Dijk, 2008: 32-33).  
From indirect (or ‘invisible’) media and political censorship, one should distinguish the so-called 
‘soft censorship’, which in foreign political science implies the practice of influencing media 
production (especially news programs) through financial and economic mechanisms (Podesta, 
2009). In his famous book, ‘A Cognitive Psychology of Mass Communication’, Richard J. Harris 
developed the concept of ‘indirect censorship’ (Harris, 2004: 206) similar to ‘soft censorship’; 
however, the American psychologist distinguished the phenomenon of ‘media self-censorship’ 
(Harris, 2004: 207) from soft censorship (which emphasizes cognitive aspects), and highlighted the 
role of stereotypes and misinformation in the media restricting public access to truthful information 
as well. Very fittingly, Thomas Müller-Kulmann analyzed these subjects in detail in his book 
‘Propaganda and Censorship in Gulf War I’ (Müller-Kulmann, 2007). 
In general, all the approaches discussed above (by both Russian and foreign authors) present 
censorship as a kind of ‘barrier for information’, or as a kind of filter (administrative, financial, 
discursive, etc.) on its way. However, the concept of censorship, comprehended as the political effect 
of symbols and metaphors of public discourse, is quite problematic precisely because of its 
metaphoricalness. The censorship status of the discourse is not formally identified here either in the 
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subject or in the object of the discourse, and censorship practices – both by fact and by their 
conception – are, as it were, dissolved in an ideological language.  
Later, in the second half – the last quarter of the XX century as telecommunication networks 
expanded, the ‘information flooding’ metaphor arose, which initially (also with a modicum of the 
ideas of Marshall McLuhan) expressed the enthusiasm of researchers regarding the decentralization 
of the system of production and dissemination of information.  
This enthusiasm gave rise to a series of ‘discoveries’, which later revealed their ambiguity: in 
particular, the ‘Gilmore law’, according to which the Internet interprets censorship as damage and 
routes around it, because it considers censorship as a threat to own existence; as well as the ‘Streisand 
effect’, consisting in the fact that attempts to block (in the conditions of new media) public access 
to information only serves as a signal to increase attention. It is noteworthy that the first voices 
warning of the ambivalent nature of the Internet were heard not so much from scientists as from 
Internet activists. These include, for example, the WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who wrote 
several books on Internet freedom and proposed a good metaphor for describing censorship by 
Internet corporations, such as Google: ‘an information pied piper’ (Assange, 2014a; Assange, 
2014b). 
Thus, the metaphor of ‘information flooding’ opens up a fundamentally new concept of political 
censorship, associated with blocking not so much information as an opportunity to perceive it. Such 
a concept also has its origins in the scientific and philosophical tradition. Thus, the authors of the 
‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’ came close to the cognitive concept of political censorship as part of 
an analysis of the phenomenon of the ‘cultural industry’, which they see as an unspoken prohibition 
not on any specific information, but on the very ability for perception and problem solving (i.e., 
selectively, coherently and in the context of social memory (Horkheimer, Adorno, 2002)). Later, 
American media theorist Neil Postman observed that ‘television is altering the meaning of "being 
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informed" by creating a species of information that might properly be called disinformation’ which 
does not mean false information but ‘misleading information – misplaced, irrelevant, fragmented or 
superficial information-information that creates the illusion of knowing something but which in fact 
leads one away from knowing’ (Postman, 2005: 107).  
But of particular importance for the theory of cognitive censorship, namely, as political censorship 
are the concepts developed in the works of Hannah Arendt such as ‘organized lying’, ‘evident non-
facts’, ‘defactualization’, and ‘political cynicism’ (Arendt 2006; Arendt 1971). These notions largely 
anticipated the concept of ‘post-truth’ that has become extremely popular in recent years as being 
peculiar to the era of ‘new media’. This era has put comprehension of the phenomenon of cognitive 
censorship on the current agenda of broad interdisciplinary research. 
Further observation of the Internet environment led to the conclusion that new forms of censorship 
use such phenomena as ‘echo chambers’ and ‘filter bubbles’ that arise based on the principle of 
homophilia, that is, love of the such-like. Eli Pariser, who wrote a book about the ‘filter bubble’ in 
2011, associated this phenomenon with ‘second-order censorship – the manipulation of curation, 
context, and the flow of information and attention’ (Pariser, 2011: 141).   
The idea that the traditional types of censorship (preliminary, punitive, etc.) are not effective in 
modern society, and therefore the mind control assumes the role and function of censorship, has 
been mentioned in passing several times in Russian academic literature (Agapova, 2012). However, 
the manipulative strategies of cognitive censorship should not be confused with the manipulative 
effects of propaganda-ideological discourse, and the actions of the cognitive censor with the work 
of a professional ideologist. The latter affects the audience not only directly, but also in a roundabout 
way, with the expectation of both immediate and also the long-term effect; in the case of mass 
propaganda, it often covers the entire audience, and not just its segments.  
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In the case of cognitive political censorship, manipulation is designed to directly, promptly, and 
specifically impact to block specific unwanted information. The very possibility of such an impact 
opened up only in the era of ‘new media’, where authoritative information sources (channels) 
disappear in the conditions of information overload. Then, it becomes possible to close access to 
certain ideas, creating an increasing excess of half-truth, ‘post-truth’, and outright lies, purposefully 
filling the media with a shaft of anonymous ‘fakes’ (‘post-facts’, ‘non-facts’ or ‘alternative facts’), 
deliberately confusing the audience and distracting it from censored political content. Thus, the 
blocking of public access to certain information is carried out not by restricting (or destroying) its 
carriers, but by blocking the ability to perceive these ideas. The very ideas do not disappear from the 
media landscape, but finding, understanding and keeping them in memory become a non-trivial task 
for a mass audience.  
Having become convinced of the inefficiency of traditional forms of censorship under the conditions 
of the ‘new media’ information flooding, the authorities nowadays learn to modify their censorship 
practices to take into account these new communicative realities. According to the Turkish 
sociologist Zeynep Tufekci, ‘producing information glut, inducing confusion and distraction, and 
mobilizing counter-movements, rather than imposing outright censorship, are becoming parts of the 
playbook of governments that confront social movements’ (Tufekci, 2017: 6–7). 
However, due to these new governmental censorship practices, the question arises of whether such 
practices apply to other, non-governmental actors? And is there truly no reason, therefore, to 
consider cognitive censorship not only as of the inheritance of authoritarian state regimes but also 
as usual practice in conditions of free political competition? Thus, is it possible, for example, to talk 
about mutual cognitive censorship of the participants in the election campaign, conducted according 
to democratic rules?  
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The purpose of this article is to clarify these issues based on an analysis of the public discourse of 
the 2018–2019 presidential election in Ukraine. 
It can be suggested as a working assumption that this case can confirm the thesis statement: cognitive 
censorship strategies can be considered not only concerning governmental activities (top-down) or 
in a situation of mass protests (or their prevention), but also horizontally, between participants of the 
election race.  
 
Materials and Methods. 
In the process of research, cognitive censorship was considered in the context of symbolic power, 
comprehended as a kind of mind control, which is carried out by symbolic elites by choosing certain 
‘genres, topics, argumentation, style, rhetoric or presentation of public texts and talk’ (van Dijk, 
2008: 33). Hence, the main thing in the implementation of cognitive censorship as part of symbolic 
power is ‘the control of the formation of social cognitions through the subtle management of 
knowledge and beliefs’ (van Dijk, 2008: 63).  
The concepts of ideological discourse and symbolic power proposed by T. van Dijk opened up the 
opportunity for developing a cognitive concept of political censorship; however, these concepts 
require at least two developmental improvements. The first of them refers to the concept of 
censorship, which, according to van Dijk, is mainly interpreted in the traditional sense and is 
problematized to a small extent. The second one is related to the cognitive effects of ‘new media’ 
such as ‘post-truth politics’, which have only begun to be grasped in the past few years.  
To elaborate the concept of cognitive political censorship, the authors used the capacious definition 
of censorship proposed by Walter Lippmann, concerning the establishment of ‘some barrier between 
the public and the event’ (Lippmann, 1997: 43). The authors associated the further development of 
the concept of political censorship with the  features of the ‘new media’, which employ all interactive 
forms of information exchange, including online media; the latter presupposes a digital form of 
10 
 
information storage, a network distribution method, a computerized processing system, etc. The 
authors presumed that the classical distinction between direct (administrative) and remote censorship 
does not lose its significance in the era of new media, but it is already not enough for understanding 
the specifics and conditions for the effectiveness of political censorship. In this vein, the concepts of 
‘invisible censorship’ (Bourdieu), ‘media self-censorship’ (Harris), ‘second-order censorship’ 
(Pariser) and other similar still are in quite a demand. The authors consider the concept of the latest 
forms of governmental censorship, currently being developed by Z. Tufekci, as a methodologically 
valuable experience in comprehending the forms and strategies of political censorship in the era of 
new media. The authors of the presented study rely on the key message which was defined by 
Turkish sociologist as follows: ‘censorship during the internet era does not operate under the same 
logic it did during the heyday of print or even broadcast television’ (Tufekci, 2017:226).  
The empirical part of the study involved the verification of the conclusions of the theoretical part 
through the operationalization of the basic concepts of the project. Relevant here is a way to monitor 
the media information and online network space by using the corresponding Russian platforms 
‘Medialogy’ and ‘YouScan’. These systems made it possible to track media publications in the 
aspect of the declared topic to the fullest extent possible, find the primary sources of news, and 
process information flows to track the natural life cycle of an information event and to separate it 
from products of manipulative technologies. Also, ‘Medialogy’ and ‘Youscan’ were used in 
identifying key newsbreaks (including the so-called ‘fake news’) and the source of the most hot-
button messages. This allowed conducting an initial analysis and identification of key sources of 
media war.  
At the next stage of the study, the sources of the information (including implicit and associated forms 
of control) were determined to identify whose interests the sources represent, as well as what forms 
of censorship in relation to alternative information they use. The quantitative analysis was not 
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enough to solve this problem; therefore, a critical discourse analysis of publications related to the 
stated topic was also undertaken.  
The authors presented the results of the analysis of the Ukrainian experience of cognitive political 
censorship in a comparative perspective with similar experience in China and Turkey.  
 
Results. 
As a result of the study, at least three interrelated strategies of cognitive political censorship were 
identified. At least1 the following strategies suggested a weakening of such basic cognitive abilities 
as attention span and coherent thought (Volkova, 2018): 
• Distraction (when, on the approaches to information that is undesirable for dissemination, the 
attention of the media audience is captured by topics that have a cognitive priority due to their 
sensationalism and proximity to the basic stereotypes); 
• Falsification (when the media environment is instantly filled with a stream of genre-structured 
false trails demeaning the sources of reliable and truthful information; the information subjected to 
an unspoken prohibition drowns in this stream of lies, eluding the attention of the recipients). 
• Absurdization (when the thematic and semantic subject matter of the media landscape is 
deliberately torn through throwing in messages that are absurdly contradicting the meaning of 
undesirable information). 
The implementation of these strategies, mutually presupposing and reinforcing each other, confuses 
their recipients and divides their consciousness from the actual history of events by making the media 
audience unable to rationally evaluate the current circumstances, including the topics of an unspoken 
censorship ban. All strategies involve ‘informational flooding’ of media audience recipients in the 
absence of generally recognized sources of reliable information.  
 
1 However, more such strategies can be identified as  is obvious from the existing analysis of deceptive strategies 
via new media. 
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The listed strategies of political censorship are well traced on the materials of Ukrainian presidential 
election campaign of 2018-2019, since its participants actively used not only straight lie, negative 
campaigning (‘bad publicity’), mud-slinging and other classical technologies peculiar to the old-
school election campaign, but also censorship practices that could be classified as the new media 
information flooding. The Ukrainian election race clashed three key political forces – administrative-
governmental structures, the party-political establishment, and the top business tycoons; this case 
turned out to be especially interesting since it employed all the key types of political censorship: 
traditional governmental (‘prohibitive’), financial and economic (‘corporate’, ‘soft’), ideological 
(‘discursive-symbolic’), and the last but not least, cognitive as such. 
For instance, the availability of lobbying power allowed Petro Poroshenko actively resort to 
traditional types of political censorship, imposing a ban on objectionable sources of information and 
thereby blocking the dissemination of the very information (sudden dismissal of Ukrainian Public 
Broadcaster Chief Zurab Alasania is just one example)2.  
However, the corruption crisis at state-owned defense contractor Ukroboronprom (Ukrainian 
Defense Industry) forced Poroshenko more actively use other resources to suppress disadvantageous 
information, and first of all, such strategy of political censorship as a falsification. Judging by the 
activity of the pro-Poroshenko mass media, several newsbreaks were thrown into the Ukrainian 
media landscape from the end of February to the first half of March, aimed at suppressing and 
drowning out the scandal with Ukroboronprom, which broke out on February 26, 2019.  
Journalists of the Nashi Groshi (‘Our Money’) program (Ukrainian Channel 24) published then the 
evidence they collected exposing a long-term corruption scheme through which hundreds of millions 
 
2 Zurab Alasania’s dismissal on the grounds of ‘insufficient coverage of the election campaign in Ukraine’ became 
one of the hot-button examples of such lobbying power. It is curious that when Volodymyr Zelensky became 
President of Ukraine, they performed ‘technological reshuffle’ with former President Petro Poroshenko: 




of hryvnias were embezzled from the Ukrainian defense complex. Moreover, the president’s friend 
and business partner, member of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleg 
Gladkovsky and his 22-year-old son were involved in this scheme. Shortly afterward (March 1, 
2019), an anti-Zelensky ‘Letter of 27 Ukrainian intellectuals’ was published, which, however, did 
not have a knock-on effect. A similar result showed the stovepiping of ‘information’ on the allegedly 
planned Russia’s imminent occupation of ‘two more’ regions of Ukraine, as well as on the 
‘Pinocchio political project’ with its outrageously delusive statement that ‘documents from the 
hacked base of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party in 2014 outlined a plan that recalls Zelensky’s 
campaign’.   
Using the strategy of distracting the attention from the topic of corruption in Ukroboronprom, 
Poroshenko tried to discredit Zelensky due to his alleged relations with Ukrainian billionaire 
business oligarch Igor Kolomoisky; as a news hook was used quite sensitive to the electorate plot of 
the disappearance of $ 41,000,000 from PrivatBank (largest commercial bank in Ukraine) depositors 
later allegedly settled on the accounts of Studio Kvartal-95 comedians through lending to companies 
linked  with Kolomoisky. In doing so, the information on corruption in the Poroshenko team was 
suppressed. This technology was also called on service in the second round of elections to divert 
attention during the preparation and conduct of the debate of presidential candidates, as well as to 
defend Poroshenko from attacks by Zelensky, including allegations of alcoholism (April 3–8). 
Below are two graphs of the distribution of this information: in the Ukrainian media (Fig. 1) and 





Fig. 1. Dissemination of information on the withdrawal of capital from PrivatBank in the 
Ukrainian media (according to Medialogy). 
 
Fig. 2. Dissemination of information on the withdrawal of capital from PrivatBank in Ukrainian 
social media (according to YouScan). 
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 No less active was the diversion strategy that Poroshenko team used in the case of stovepiping the 
‘information’ on the alleged Zelensky’s drug addiction. This newsbreak received the greatest 
distribution on April 4, 2019; however, even more indicative was the narrative (actively promoted 
by team Poroshenko) of Zelensky’s weakness and cowardice, his incompetence and infantilism, 
dependence on the tycoon Kolomoisky, and even from Russian elites. All this was performed to 
initially devalue the role of Zelensky as a potential commander in chief of the Ukrainian armed 
forces. This narrative was intended to distract the audience from the corruption scandal with 
Ukroboronprom, moreover, on the issue-related field of ‘defending the Fatherland’. The peak of the 
spread of this burst occurred just on April 1, 2019, although it has periodically emerged earlier (Fig. 
3). 
 
Fig. 3. Dissemination of information making absurd the role of Zelensky as commander in chief of 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces (according to YouScan). 
For Zelensky, on the other hand, the most painful topics that he tried to ‘suppress’ with the help of 
cognitive censorship were news hooks on his drug addiction and incompetence, as well as the topic 
of election debates. His team also tried to neutralize the disadvantageous information through 
absurdization, thus suppressing the information to be censored by stovepiping counter-matters into 
the media environment. Thus, a mud-slinging on the drug addiction was suppressed by Zelensky’s 
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team by promoting messages that Zelensky, on the contrary, allegedly saved Yevgeniy Koshevoy, 
his colleague from the Studio Kvartal-95, from drug addiction. According to Medialogy, 
chronologically this message was the most widespread just in the period of the scandal with alleged 
drug addiction (Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 4. Media coverage on Zelensky ‘saving’ Koshevoy from drug addiction (according to 
Medialogy). 
One of the sizzlers of the second round of the presidential campaign was the requirement for 
candidates to undergo a medical examination with testing for drug and alcohol addiction. The reason 
was the allegations of Poroshenko supporters towards Zelensky’s drug abuse, first went on public 
on February 9, 2019, by political activists in Lviv and actively promoted by pro-Poroshenko mass 
media (Video: Voters publicly accused… 2019). Later this topic was revalued on social networks 
also by Poroshenko supporters (Kravtsev, 2019).  
According to some Ukrainian journalists, Poroshenko campaign headquarters was preparing a whole 
campaign to go viral with the ‘information’ on Zelensky’s drug addiction, also with the involvement 
of relevant compromising evidence (Post by T. Nikolaenko on Facebook, 2019). This was indirectly 
confirmed by the public activity of the acclaimed political scientist Oleksandr Paliy, who demanded 
Volodymyr Zelensky to undergo a ‘drug abuse screening test’ (April 1, 2019, ‘ELECTIONS 2019’ 
Marathon), as well as by the scandal press conference of Zelensky’s quondam friend Denis 
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Manzhosov, announced on April 11, 2019, but canceled under strange circumstances (Lukashova, 
Sarakhman, 2019).  
In this situation, quite understandable appeared the desire of Volodymyr Zelensky to get ahead and 
try to censor the upcoming ‘exposure’ in the style of the mentioned strategy of absurdization. In a 
video published on April 3, 2019, on the YouTube channel and distributed via social media and 
calling for debate (Zelensky: ‘Let's go to the debate!!!’… 2019), he seized the initiative and 
demanded a medical examination of his opponent, transparently hinting at rumors of Poroshenko’s 
alcoholism, persisted in 2014-15. The absurdity of these hints was quite obvious since Petro 
Poroshenko has long time suffered from diabetes, so he could not be an alcoholic in any way, and 
by 2019 the Ukrainian society was well aware of this. Therefore, the topic of his alleged alcohol 
abuse was not used by any of Poroshenko opponents in the election race, either in the press or in 
social media. Despite this, the result in the form of a response in the media and networks was 
significant (judging by the Medialogy and YouScan data, see Fig. 5 and 6); however, this topic 
retained its link to the subject of the alleged Zelensky’s addiction, which gives reason to doubt the 
success of his attempt at cognitive censorship.  
 
Fig. 5. Dissemination of the news break about Zelensky requiring Poroshenko to pass a medical 




Fig. 6. Dissemination of the news break about Zelensky requiring Poroshenko to pass a medical 
examination (YouScan and social media). 
The strategies of falsification and distraction employed by team Zelensky were more successful. 
Media loyal to this candidate also reacted with a series of fibs targeting acting President of Ukraine 
to reduce to absurdity quite justified criticism of the growing ‘Ze candidate’. Thus, for example, the 
program ‘Ukrainian Sensations’, Season 10, Issue 8 ‘50 Shades of Poroshenko’ on 1 + 1 TV channel, 
stovepiped the broadcast on Poroshenko allegedly killed his brother. However, due to its apparent 
absurdity, such ‘information’ could not be widely disseminated. A much greater resonance and 
enthusiasm of the voters was caused by the ‘anti-fake’ campaign launched by Zelensky in social 
media, which allowed declaring ‘fake’ any negative information on him. Also noteworthy was the 
creation and active promotion in social networks of ‘Dark-PR Library n.a. Petro Oleksiyovych 
(Poroshenko)’ (Fig. 5). 
 




The hashtag #shotutdumat’ (pidging Ukrainian for ‘what is there to think’) was the most popular 
one; it actually represented a whole campaign to discredit Poroshenko and the media under his 
control (see Fig. 6): 
 
Fig. 6. Dissemination of ‘Poroshenko fakes vs. Zelensky’ in social networks, including the hashtag 
#shotutdumat’ (according to YouScan). 
But even more significant was the concomitant of the news feeds hashtag #nidebatam (Ukr. for ‘No 
for debates’), which in April alone received 12166 messages. This move very effectively ‘silenced’ 
interest (previously heated by Poroshenko supporters) in the debate through an appeal to emotions: 
‘We don’t need debate; we need children not to die! ... We don’t need debate – we have already 
heard everything and see everything! No need to spend money – better give them targeted to each 
cancer patient, and there are 170 thousand of them! Go away, Petro Oleksiyovych!’3. 
 
Discussion. 
The issue of new forms of political censorship is considered in the context of an up-to-date academic 
discussion around the role played by social media in the democratic system of society. Some authors 
(Vaidhyanathan, 2018) describe social networks as a propaganda machine that spreads fakes among 
a multimillion audience, distracts people from important issues, incites hatred and fanaticism, and 
 
3 Originated April 9 on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/markevichsumy/videos/2100494136686507/ This 
post gained 1.6 million views and 75 thousand reposts, it was spreaded until the end of April. 
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undermines public trust - and at the same time participates in wide social supervision. The opposite 
point of view is shared by van Dijk, Poell, and de Waal [van Dijk, Poell, de Waal, 2018], who 
positively appreciate the opportunity provided by online platforms for instant access to Facebook 
news while bypassing official media institutions, which leads to the transformation of civic practices 
and seriously affects democratic processes.  
However, both of these positions underestimate the potential of the discourse of modern media as 
the basis for new forms of political censorship. On the contrary, the Ukrainian case of the 2018–
2019 election campaign provides samples of cognitive censorship as a way to protect the recipient 
from information that is objectionable to the initiator of this type of censorship and/or the person in 
whose interests this censorship is carried out. This is a relatively new kind of political control that 
has arisen along with the ‘new media’ and the adaptation of traditional media to the new realities of 
the ‘information flooding’ (through the popularization of ‘live broadcasting’, ‘reporting from the 
scene’, etc., when it turns out to be impossible to edit the material before launching it on the air). 
Although the ‘blabbering’ and discrediting of the interlocutor providing unfavorable information 
live on the air appeared as cognitive censorship techniques in traditional media talk shows, this type 
of censorship was most widely used in ‘new media’, namely, on electronic publications forums, on 
social networks, etc., that is, where it turned out to be impossible to block the flows or channels of 
information by means of direct administration. This change could not but be reflected in the practices 
of censoring information in the process of struggle for power and/or its preservation, with the only 
proviso that those in power possess administrative resources and therefore can use the traditional 
form of ‘prohibitive’ political censorship, while the absence of such resources from the opposition 




The phenomenon of cognitive censorship does not mean that the role of classical censorship is 
decreasing, especially in countries with an authoritarian form of government. However, effective 
censorship of this kind in the Internet environment is a costly affair that only powerful countries 
(like China) or political players within certain countries (such as possessing lobbying power or an 
‘administrative resource’) can afford.  
The first large-scale studies of the Chinese experience of direct censorship of political content in 
social networks (or rather a prompt removal of messages posted by individuals) date back to the 
early 2010s [Bamman, O'Connor, Smith, 2012]. A review of scientific research on this topic suggests 
the presence in China of several forms of direct Internet censorship, the most notable of which are 
the denial and concealment of facts, the absence of comments, and the contradiction of rumors (the 
common example could be the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and 2015 Tianjin explosions). However, 
even this large-scale national project does not provide for the establishment of total control over the 
Internet community. According to experts and researchers, way more effective in terms of 
influencing public opinion is the use by the Chinese authorities of such forms of censorship, which 
can be defined as ‘cognitive strategies’, and which are also strongly reminiscent of the Ukrainian 
case.  
First of all, this is a strategy of distraction. Facts suggest that the Chinese government is hiring 
‘online commentators’ to post propaganda on social networks. This group is derogatorily called ‘The 
50 Cent Party’ or Wumao. This resource, for example, was used to struggle against and to debunk 
the leaders of the democratic movements in Hong Kong (Oiwan, 2012). Margaret Roberts believes 
that more subtle censorship, such as hiding search results or presenting distracting information on 
the Internet, is more effective than open censorship [Roberts, 2018]. Y. Cheng and S.J. Lee also 
consider strategic distraction, denial of rumors, myth, and censorship of media content as 
communicative crisis strategies (Cheng, Lee 2019). 
22 
 
The strategy of facts spinning is clearly represented in the Chinese experience of cognitive 
censorship. There is evidence that Chinese state-owned media such as the Global Times, Straits 
Today and Taihai Net first publish fake news, then Chinese cyber soldiers and 50 Cent Army report 
bogus stories via Facebook, LINE, and YouTube [Everington, 2018]. During the riots in Xinjiang in 
2013, local governments themselves fabricated a media environment by publishing fake news or 
hiring other participants to promote and legitimize Chinese Communist Party policies (Cheng, Lee 
2019). An integral part of the falsification strategy is rumor management practice, J. Zeng, K. Chan, 
and K. Fu highlighted two rumor management strategies based on the analysis of the content of the 
largest Chinese microblogging platform Sina Weibo on the 2015 Tianjin bombings in China, namely, 
the rumor moderation strategy with their (most often) refutation, and content removal (Zeng, Chan, 
Fu, 2017). 
The success of all the mentioned strategies of governmental cognitive censorship in China is due to 
the also above-mentioned phenomenon of information flooding. When ordinary citizens become 
confused with the excess of information they have, organized groups with the resources and 
incentives to control this information, on the contrary, act purposefully, using information flooding 
and chaos as methods of control over the provision of information for Internet users (Roberts, 2014). 
The Chinese case also obviously demonstrated how the flooding is produced in the media 
environment. S. Bradshaw and P. Howard, exploring the organizational aspects of ‘cyber squads’ 
activities (governmental, military or political party teams seeking to manipulate public opinion 
through social networks), concluded that information warfare is becoming a global phenomenon. 
They contend that at least 28 countries use a significant amount of human and other resources to 
manage and manipulate public opinion on the Internet. Moreover, it was surprisingly noted that 
authoritarian regimes are guided more by citizens of their country, and democratic ones - by foreign 
audiences (Howard, Bradshaw, 2017). 
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Swedish political scientist Staffan I. Lindberg conducted a comparative analysis of two hundred 
states in terms of political censorship and concluded that Taiwan ranks first in the list of countries 
facing threats of misinformation; Lindberg also suggested that China is the main force behind the 
attacks (Tzu-ti, 2019). According to K. Everington materials, China has its own ‘troll factory’, which 
specializes in training domestic media and creating accounts on Weibo, Facebook, YouTube, 
Twitter, PTT, and other social media platforms to launch ‘cognitive space warfare’ and intervene in 
elections in Taiwan (Everington, 2018). 
For political players with less advanced technical capabilities than China, cognitive censorship is 
perhaps the only way to control the content of social networks. This is one of the theses that detailed 
in Z. Tufekci monograph, devoted to the new forms of political censorship.  
Turkish academician also cites the Chinese authorities as an example, which, in her opinion, does 
not try to censor everything they don’t like on social networks, but often flood the latter with 
distracting information and thereby block the public’s access to unwanted information.  
Zeynep Tufekci sees a similar practice in the media tactics of Recep Erdogan’s government after the 
failed coup in Turkey in July 2016, when due to the overload of inconsistent information even she, 
being a professional sociologist, could not say exactly what was happening in some parts of her 
home country. A little later, impressed by this experience, Tufekci in one of her tweeted messages 
summarized the essence of cognitive censorship in the era of new media: ‘It's no longer age of 
information scarcity. Censorship works by info glut, distraction, confusion and stealing political 
focus & attention’ (Tufekci, 2016). 
 Tufekci shows that in terms of the evolution of political censorship Turkey in recent decades ‘went 
from a nation under severe military censorship to one in which over half the population is online’ 
(Tufekci, 2017:31). At the very least, three types of political censorship replaced each other in the 
role of leaders: firstly, strict prohibitive censorship; secondly, soft political censorship as ‘a new 
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censorship regime … based on ownership of mass media by corporations that depended on 
government favor for-profit’ (Tufekci 2017:32). Thirdly, it is political censorship referred to in this 
article as ‘cognitive’, which Tufekci associates with the ‘stealing political focus & attention’ 
mentioned above. Tufekci considers the attention, on the one hand, as a decisive cognitive resource 
that limits other resources of social movements, which, however, is no longer the monopoly of the 
media. And on the other hand, Turkish academician interprets censorship in a broad sense ‘as the 
denial of attention through multiple means’ (Tufekci, 2017). The key point here is the loss of media 
monopoly on public attention. However, other cognitive functions, for example, the ability to 
coherently form an opinion on current events or store them in memory, can also be turned off by 
political censorship in the era of new media. Moreover, these cognitive functions are being turned 
off in relation to specific information, before which a barrier of ignorance and misunderstanding 
should be built for the general public.  
 
CONCLUSIONS. 
In the social and human sciences, the concept of cognitive political censorship has two kinds of 
premises: in one respect, it is the experience of conceptualizing political censorship as a social 
institution in a wider and more complex cultural context than in the case of the formal-legal concept 
of censorship; of the second part, it is the evolutionary logic of political censorship itself as a practice 
of governmental bodies.  
In the first case, we are talking about the censorship effects of public discourse, which appears 
ideological just by its nature. Such is the meaning of the concepts of ‘invisible censorship’ 
(Bourdieu), ‘media self-censorship’ (Harris) and others, comprehended as manifestations of 
‘symbolic power’ (van Dijk). Censorship is conceived here as a discursive act, the political and 
proper censorship status of which is often implicit and metaphorical. Symbols and metaphors of the 
political language ‘censor’ public discourse, guiding it to the direction desired by the authorities, but 
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this does not mean a deliberate weakening of the audience’s basic cognitive abilities, which, on the 
contrary, is a feature of cognitive censorship. This is also directly related to the fact that all earlier 
forms of political censorship sought to build a barrier between the public and undesirable 
information did not require weakening the cognitive apparatus of the audience.  
However, with the advent of new media featured by ‘information overload’, the situation changes 
dramatically: phenomena like the ‘Gilmore law’, ‘Streisand effect’, etc. make the censorship 
‘barrier’ strategy ineffective. At the same time, the very ‘information flooding’ creates the ground 
for ‘second-order censorship’ (Pariser); this is represented by the new and more successful strategies 
for political censorship of public discourse, exploiting the disorientation of the audience of new 
media.  
All of it means that effective political censorship, especially in technically inferior countries, in the 
digital age cannot rely on hiding (or blocking public access to) the text as a carrier of certain 
information. Therefore, the newest effective forms of censorship have explored not the textual, but 
the cognitive dimension of public communication, where restricting access to unwanted information 
(ideas) can be realized through the blocking of basic cognitive functions, and first of all, the ability 
to focus on certain topics and problems. Moreover, the mentioned blocking is conducted in the case 
of cognitive censorship, not as a side and inadvertent effect of ideological propaganda, but 
purposefully and situationally, with identifiable subjects and objects of censorship.  
The above-cited experience of the PRC and Turkey proved the evolution of governmental political 
censorship from its direct (hard) forms to types of indirect (soft) and later cognitive censorship. 
Currently, it can be referred to as the mutual complementarity of all types of political censorship, 
which are simultaneously practiced in any country, but with different accents and depending on the 
situation. In this sense, there is no reason to limit political censorship only to the practice of 
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authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but it is advisable to consider it as one of the stability factors 
of any political system.  
Using the databases of the Russian media monitoring platforms Medialogy and YouScan, as well as 
conducted discourse analysis of key publications on the topic, the authors of the presented study 
identified at least three interrelated strategies of cognitive political censorship that were actively 
used in the media environment during the last presidential election in Ukraine: distraction through 
spread of sensational stories; falsification through a stream of genre-structured misinformation; 
absurdization of specific information through the mass distribution of fake counter messages. 
The implementation of these strategies of cognitive political censorship was strengthened by 
traditional types of political censorship: administrative-governmental (‘direct’, ‘prohibitive’), 
financial and economic (‘indirect’, ‘soft’), and discursive (‘symbolic’).  
Comparison of the Ukrainian case study with the diverse experience of cognitive censorship 
implemented by governmental authorities in China and Turkey shows the relevance of the mentioned 
strategies regardless of the sphere of application (protest or election campaign), the subject of 
censorship practice (government or non-state players) or political regime (authoritarian or 
democratic system).  
The presented article is quite relevant in its conceptual part to the development of a special area of 
research devoted to censorship practices in politics and culture. Moreover, it makes a certain 
contribution to the general study of political communication, revolutionized by new media. The 
empirical material of the article can be used to further study the authors’ concept of cognitive 
political censorship; it also may be of use for the analysis of current political processes in Ukraine.  
 
Recommendations. 
The concept of cognitive political censorship opens up a wide field for further research. First of all, 
the concept itself needs to be clarified in reference to other types of political censorship, which will 
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require not only concept analytics but also comparison and systematization of empirical material on 
other cases. Further research could, for instance, reveal cognitive censorship of politically 
undesirable information in its implementation through various kinds of amnesic effects produced by 
the new media information flooding. No less promising is the study of resistance practices to the 
latest (cognitive) forms of political censorship.  
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